Law Association for Asia and the Pacific) organised an interdisciplinary seminar at Madras on "The strategies for Professional Collaboration to Promote the Rights of the Mentally 111", which was attended by members of the legal and mental health profession. While an atmosphere of bonhomie prevailed, there were also undercurrents of mutual discomfort. This discomfort was generally due to fears of trespass by the other profession into the area perceived as one's own territory.
Differences in viewpoint are, however, not entirely unfounded. "When a psychiatrist examines an individual at the request of court most of the principler that usually govern the doctor-patient relationship are altered" (Chiswick, 1985) . As Rappeport (1981) has noted, for the psychiatrists the court is "another house.... with its different motives, goals and rules of conduct". While the psychiatrist is concerned primarily with the diagnosis of mental disorders and the welfare of the patient, the court is often mainly concerned with the determination of competency, dangerousness, or diminished responsbility and/or the welfare of other members of society. While the court is concerned with attribution of responsbility (or its lack), there is a distinct tendency among psychiatrists to be philosophical determinists based on the implicit assumption that, that which had a cause can not be freely willed, a philosophical error dating back to antiquity.
Legal and mental health professionals often fail to understand each other's disciplines and problems. Several courts, both Indian and foreign, have criticized psychiatric testimony for the use of ununderstandable jargon. Psychiatrists, on the other hand, complain that the law has not kept pace with advances in psychiatry. The law is concerned with the determination of legal status and not about hypothetical explanations of behaviour. A court has noted that, "a person does not become a 'Lunatic' under the lunacy act on the debatable niceties of psychological and psychiatric theories.... it is not ultimate responsibility of the mental specialists and specialist doctors whose views are always entitled to great deference.... to find out and hold that a person is a 'Lunatic' " (Ranjeet Kumar Ghose V. Secretary, Indian Psychoanalytical Society, 1963, 1 Cri.LJ 579). However, the courts, often sharing the layman's concept of "insanity", have sometimes been skeptical of diagnoses like delusional disorder or even paranoid schizophrenia as a defence when the patient does not appear to be obviously mentally disordered. Psychiatrists must communicate with the legal profession in a language understandable and meaningful to it. Modern psychiatry conceptualizes mental disorders as numerous distinct categories, often with different etiology, treatment, course and outcome, the difficulty in translating from this framework to a unitary concept of 'insanity' is understandable, but it is not incapable of resolution if one appreciates the defining characteristic and purpose of the legal definition of mental illness.
Psychiatrists, in general, resent legal "interference" in psychiatric treatment procedures,fearing, not entirely without justification, that unduly cumbersome or restrictive legal requirements may cause some patients to be deprived of potentially beneficial treatment or expose others in society to risk, and would swamp the medical and judicial systems, both of which are already overworked, in view of the enormous number of patients in our country. However, abuse of psychiatric patients by relatives or by mental health professionals is not unheard of. Abuse of psychiatry for political purpose is well known. A recent special feature in the India Today (Vinayak, 1992) highlighted the plight of mentally disordered persons committed to a mental hospital in Amritsar who, unable to stand trial due to mental disorder, were languishing in custody for upto four times the duration of life sentence. The responsbility of such abuse rests with law, mental health, the administration, and society at large, and it may be myopic to flaw any one group. A concerted result-oriented effort must urgently replace the apathy with which such exposures are often met.
Issues in relation to the interaction between law and mental health also require input from other fields like philosophy, sociology, etc. To take just one example, laws in relation to the rights of the mentally disordered are based implicitly on a philosophical view of the nature of rights as such. A right is an ethical-legal principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a soc<al context. Rights protect the individuals in a social context; they are a means of subordinating society to moral law. It is crucial to note that the freedom is to the action, not to the object of the action. Thus, The right to seek employment does not mean that the employers should be forced to employ persons recovered from mental disorder. The ethical basis of rights necessarily exclude their exercise to violate the rights of others. Similarly, a voluntary patient has no Right to treatment (who is to be forced to pay for it?), but is free to seek treatment anywhere and, if maltreated, to seek redressal under civil or criminal law.
The two professions need to interact appropriately with each other and understand each other's language, viewpoint, expertise, and limitations. The dialogue, in which the SCARF-LA WASIA seminar was an important step, must go on for the common goal of better care for the mentally disordered. It may be worthwhile to develop speciality groups of both lawyers and mental health professionals who should specialise in law and mental health.
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